


# What is Unique about Behavioural Economics?

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# **Decision Research Domains**

**Decision making under certainty (multi-attribute choice)**

**Decision making under risk**

**Decision making and time (intertemporal choice)**

**Interactive decision making (game theory)**

# What makes you choose to have that extra drink?



## **“Traditional” explanations for this extra drink**

- 1. Because of you ‘believe’ it is appropriate?**
- 2. Because you expect it will make you ‘feel’ good?**
- 3. Because you ‘prefer’ it over reading a book?**



## Economic theory is the starting point for understanding behaviour in public policy

- Rational Choice Theory and utility maximisation

$$\max_{x_i^t \in X_i} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \sum_{s_t \in S_t} p(s_t) U(x_i^t | s_t)$$

- In social and health psychology, rational choice theory is embodied in linear ‘Expectancy Value’ models



# Traditional approaches in public health also describe the causal “inner” states (beliefs, desires, etc.)




Figure 2.4: Rosenstock's Health Belief Model (1975)



## If not good enough, then find more causal states...




Figure 2.3: Fishbein and Ajzen's Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), (1975)



## and more ...




Figure 2.6: Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), (1986)





## and even more...




Figure 2.12: Triandis' Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB), (1977) [reproduced from Jackson 2005]



## Then add some external factors too...




Figure 2.15: Vlek et al's Needs Opportunities Abilities (NOA) Model (1997)



# Then link them all together...




Figure 3.21: Bagozzi et al's Comprehensive Model (2002)



**Still only  $\sim$  3%-28% variance explained...**

**see Webb & Sheeran (2006) for a review**



## What we have learned over > 50 years of research in behavioural economics?

“People know the price of everything, but the value of nothing” *Oscar Wilde*



“It turns out that the environmental effects on behaviour are a lot stronger than most people expect” *Nobel Laureate Prof Daniel Kahneman*



“Information & information processing are complements” *Colin Camerer*




## So why is behaviour so unstable?

- We \*infer\* our inner life and our actions from (limited) information that is currently accessible
  - from the environment
  - from memory
- Corollary: We do not have any direct access to “inner” beliefs, desires etc...
  - the illusion of ‘informed’ or ‘reasoned’ choice



# A toy model of the mind



## Inferring our own beliefs 1

- Festinger & Carlsmith (1963)
  1. People do a boring task
  2. Then paid \$1 or \$20 to persuade others to do it
    - People paid more find it more aversive; less likely to do it again, etc.
  
- Why did I do this?
  - “If I was only paid \$1, it can’t have been too bad”





## Inferring our own beliefs 2

- Reber & Schwarz (1999)
  - “Fluency” of reading affects plausibility of a statement
    - **Osarno is a town in Chile**
    - Osarno is a town in Chile
  - But effect is cancelled when people have an alternative explanation (poor photocopier)
  
- Alter & Oppenheimer (2006)
  - IPOs with ‘fluent’ names do substantially better
    - **KAR** vs **RDO**



## Inferring our own beliefs 3

- Rothman & Schwarz (1998)
  - Men inferred that they are at higher risk of heart disease after recalling fewer risk-increasing behaviours
- Schwarz et al
  - Generate **3 vs. 6 reasons** why you like your partner and happy with a decision
  - **3/6** reasons is **easy/hard** → **high/low** fluency → infer **strong/weak** commitment → **higher/lower** self-report on happiness with decision, partner, etc.



# Inferring our own feelings 1

- Schachter and Singer (1962)
  - Epinephrine injections
    - Raising arousal
  - Informed (or not) about side-effects
  - Put with **euphoric** or **angry** 'stooges'
- Higher arousal → participants are more **euphoric/angry**
- When people can 'explain away' arousal, effect much reduced



## Inferring our own feelings 2

- Dutton and Aron (1974)
  - Female interviewers of male bridge-crossers
    - **low** vs **high** bridge
  - Gave phone number for “further explanation”

More calls to interviewers for **high** bridge


**Arousal (caused by high bridge)  
misattributed as caused by  
attractiveness**



## Inferring our own feelings 3




£5



£50



# Inferring our own feelings 3



Plassmann H, O'Doherty J, Shiv B, Rangel A:

Marketing actions can modulate neural representation of experienced pleasantness. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2008, 105:1050-1054.



# Inferring our own preferences 1

- Johansson et al (2006), *Science*
- False feedback on date choices
  - not noticed
  - rationalization given
  - later preferences changed
  
- And it works with jam




Nature Reviews | Neuroscience




## Inferring our own preferences 2

- Vlaev et al (2009)
- People cannot stably determine preferences between pain and money
- No idea what is a “reasonable” trade-off






# Inferring our own preferences 3



Tremblay & Schultz (1999). Relative reward preference in primate orbitofrontal cortex. Nature 398: 704-708.



## Inferring our own preferences 4

- Shafir et al

Expensive, but exciting holiday

vs.

Cheap, but dull holiday



**Bali**




**Bournemouth**



# Which holiday would you **choose**?

Reason: "It's exciting!"



**Bali**




**Bournemouth**



# Which holiday would you **reject**?

Reason: “It’s too expensive!”





**Bali**






**Bournemouth**




# Inferring our own (risk) preferences 5






# Inferring our own preferences 6



## Implications


- Beliefs and values are improvised on the fly
- Not products of stable, if somewhat hidden, motives
- Options are valued relative to what we can compare against





# MINDSPACE

*Influencing behaviour through public policy*



# So you could have that extra drink for a mindspace full of reasons...



# Appendix: Relative judgment

Wood , Brown, et al.


## Evaluation by *local* comparison

- Mental inference algorithm:
  - Construct a mental sample (mostly friends, colleagues)
  - Count who weighs, drinks, earns *less* than me
  - Count who weighs, drinks, earns *more* than me
  - Compare the two numbers





## If all we have is relative comparison...

- Perhaps the most powerful source of comparison is *other people*
- E.g., how we perceive our own weight



## We evaluate ourselves by comparison with others

- People estimate their own weight, BMI etc
- What predicts their estimates?
- Not actual BMI
- But rank BMI measured against friends



## Similarly for alcohol consumption

Result:

- Attitudes and beliefs about consumption are predicted:
  - Not (much) by amount of own drinking
  - Not by relation of own drinking to mean of others
  - Best predicted by rank position of self in assumed distribution
- This mechanism can be used for “nudging” interventions

